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The field of cultural studies has emerged over the last few decades to become a
primary locus of interdisciplinary ferment in today’s university. As its modes of
inquiry circulate across disciplines, there is one circuit that to this day remains
notably blocked: namely, that linking cultural and religious studies. To begin to
remedy this situation, this essay aims to convince scholars who study culture that
religion is a primary mode of acculturation and that it is incumbent upon scholars to
pursue an interdisciplinary dialogue concerning religion. While this has taken place
between anthropology and religious studies – indeed, the former has been a key
discursive source for the latter – the dialogue between religion departments and
other sites of cultural studies is still in its infancy. To pursue this rapprochement,
this essay revisits Marx’s views of religion, on the suspicion that his inverse posi-
tion in the two fields is among the primary reasons for this blockage.
In the field of religious studies, Weber and Durkheim have become privileged
figures for defining the methods of analysis and the modes of interpretation with
which scholars have approached religious phenomena. Although a figure of equal
stature, Marx is rarely invoked in religious studies, but in cultural studies his work
provides a virtually unrivaled orientating perspective. At first glance, this is as it
should be: it would be difficult, and some might even say unfair, to approach Marx
as a scholar of religion because, unlike these others, Marx’s understanding of
modern commerce and politics largely determined his conception of religion. As a
result, Marx’s interest focused primarily on the way that religious practices and
idioms influence the perception – or, the misperception – of politico-economic
phenomena. This has contributed to the received idea that Marx redescribed the
former as mere effects of the latter.1  Perhaps because Marx is thought to have
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committed the sin of reductionism,2  many scholars studying religions reject a Marxist
framework in favor of a Weberian or Durkheimian one.
Despite the rather diffuse attention that Marx paid to this topic, because reli-
gions are historical phenomena that affect every sphere of society, a theory that
offers the most compelling account of historical processes and modern social dy-
namics would be of great service to their study. Furthermore, since religions were
only of secondary interest to Marx, the argument that his concept of religion was
flawed would constitute only a weak criticism of Marx’s theories as a whole. Be-
sides, like Marx, both Durkheim and Weber predicted a diminishing role for reli-
gions in modern societies, and also rejected the notion that the category of religion
constitutes an ahistorical and universal datum. Hence, the marginal role Marx plays
in religious studies as opposed to cultural studies cannot follow solely from the
charge of reductionism. Once we factor out the fact that all three predicted an ever-
diminishing role for religions as societies modernize, might we find the means to
restore a Marxist perspective on religion to these fields?
It might be that this is already happening to some degree. For example, a scholar
of religion recently formulated the dilemma facing the field as a choice between
playing the role of “critics” or “caretakers” (McCutcheon). Because the latter term
implies that scholars should support or endorse religions as endangered phenom-
ena, it now appears to be a residue of the “secularization hypothesis” that Weber
proposed and Peter Berger refined (to the point, ultimately, of rejection).3  As the
intensification of religious activity taking place in Africa, Asia, and North and
South America attests, religion is hardly at risk of disappearing. However, if recent
decades disprove the imminent and inevitable advance of secularization, this effer-
vescence coincides with an ever-widening gap between the rich and the poor both
intra- and internationally.4  While admittedly such a correlation between politico-
economic conditions and religious participation need not denote causation, such
trends should prompt a return to Marx’s positions regarding the relationship be-
tween religions and political economy.
In support of this return, one could argue that while Marx certainly reduces
religion by dismissing all claims regarding its otherworldly or supernatural origins
and ends, this is not far from the agnostic position adopted by any contemporary
scholar in a secular university. Furthermore, as prototypically human phenomena
Marx took great interest in religions and has much to say about them. In fact, this
paper will argue that the depiction of religion as an epiphenomenon is itself a
secondary effect both of Marx’s methodological premises and his rhetorical strate-
gies. Several recent texts have underscored the role that religious tropes play in
Marx’s rhetorical practice. Whether we consider the analysis of Marx’s prophetic
and messianic figures in Derrida’s Specters of Marx, or Marx’s inversions of angels
and saints in John Schad’s Queer Fish: Christian Unreason from Darwin to Derrida,
religiously-inflected language now seems a critical component of Marx’s rhetorical
success. To think otherwise and attempt to quarantine Marx’s truth from his rheto-
ric, or treat his texts as if they were the neutral bearers of his theories embroils one
in the myth of scientism. Even if we focus solely on these hypotheses, their material
efficacy — far from treating religions as negligible — actually plays an important
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role in Marxist theory, especially in passages where Marx’s analysis is more histo-
riographical than theoretical.
This paper will thus pursue a series of questions. First, I offer a critique ofWeber’s
Protestant Ethic thesis as an explanation of the role played by religion in the devel-
opment of capitalism. Then I turn to a few of Marx’s analyses of religion, culminat-
ing in Marx’s examination of the role of the Reformation in the process of primitive
or primary capital accumulation (the theory of the origin of capitalism that Weber’s
thesis opposed.) As I trace the way that Marx recognized the real consequences of
religions in their socio-historical contexts, I will excavate a Marxist perspective on
religion that can contribute to the project of rethinking some of the basic premises
that have constituted the fields of religious and cultural studies.
The Weberian Paradigm and Religious Studies
For the social sciences, cultural and religious studies, Peacock and Kirsch claim
that Durkheim and Weber offer contrasting analytical paradigms premised on the
comparison between traditional and modern societies: “[Durkheimains] often at-
tribute to modern rites, symbols, or customs, dynamics and functions that appar-
ently underlie primitive rites, symbols, or customs…. [Weberians] attempt to define
the dimensions according to which modern patterns have evolved beyond the
primitive patterns” (115). Although the problem of the continuity or discontinuity
between such societies cannot be reduced to an either/or choice, certain phenom-
ena lend themselves more readily to one description or the other. For example, in
regards to material and commercial culture, or the development of capitalism in
general, discontinuity seems more the case, while in matters of religion, where
tradition often plays an important role, one might make a case for continuity. As
opposed to the liberal meliorism and ethnocentric evolutionism of early Victorian
anthropologists such as E. B. Tylor and James Frazer, who assumed that the En-
lightenment and the rise of science clearly separated the modernizing West from the
rest of the world, the Durkheimian emphasis on the continuity between primitive
and modern societies affords many opportunities to critically examine contempo-
rary conditions. Such is the case with Bellah’s notion of civil religion,5  for example,
which can underscore the jingoistic nationalism it often foments as well as the
connotations of xenophobic tribalism evoked by “One nation under God.”
Yet the shadow Weber casts is longer. The immense scope of his analyses, his
detailed typology of religious agents that complicates the clergy/laity distinction,
and his bold comparative hypotheses offer a number of heuristic and hermeneutical
tools to the scholar of religion. Moreover, religion for Weber is a focal factor of
socio-historical development, since one consequence of his social nominalism is
that the role of the individual agent and her motivations are of primary importance.
It is no wonder, then, that Weber has informed so many of the great works that
address the role of religious phenomena in the modern world.
There is another reason as well, perhaps one that follows more from the histori-
cal reception of Weber’s work. In a way similar to Weber’s Protestant Ethic thesis,
which accords a prominent role to the Reformation as a liberation of individual
religious and economic energies, the triumphalist narrative of American
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exceptionalism describes the formation of American society in similar terms. In its
religious variant, this narrative hails the Constitution’s Disestablishment Clause as
an unprecedented breakthrough,6  one that made America a country where, para-
doxically yet almost naturally, Protestants will flourish while adherents of other
religions will flounder until they adopt Protestant tactics of religious reproduction
like economic individualism and anti-clerical attitudes. As theorists often feel a
moral imperative to employ a paradigm that resembles the self-conception of the
religious practitioners they analyze, to do justice to the self-conception of their
native informants scholars all too often adopt narrative frameworks that pivot on
the success or failure of individual liberation or salvation. This kind of fairness,
however, comes at a cost: when scholars so closely approximate the worldview of their
objects of scrutiny, they effectively defuse the possibility of critique. Thus, in a kind of
historical irony, Weber (and his emphasis on the discontinuity between modern, secu-
lar societies and more traditional, religious ones) predominates despite the fact that
Bellah’s Durkheimian notion of civil religion is so descriptive of the American form of
patriotic self-regard. The irony consists precisely in the fact that Weber’s hypotheses
of rationalization and secularization have come to serve as fundamental myths in
American civil religion. That a scientific hypothesis should come to serve as a reli-
gious myth should come as no surprise, since any putatively secular cultural artifact,
be it an image, a narrative or a theory, is subject to this type of dialectical reversal.
This is not to say that Weber’s predominance is solely the function of ideology
or prejudice. Nonetheless, however appealing his work is to scholars of religion
and culture, I would argue that Weber’s hypotheses concerning the role of religion
– Protestantism and Calvinism in particular – in the genesis of capitalism, while an
interesting contribution, can serve as a complication but not as a replacement of
Marx’s account. After examining a few elements of Weber’s Protestant Ethic thesis,
I will then return to Marx’s account of the secularization of church property in the
English Reformation that precipitated the dispossession of the peasantry and cre-
ated the preconditions for further capitalist development. After clarifying Marx’s
positions regarding religion’s relations to the ideological superstructure of society,
I will explain why only a myth stands in the way of utilizing Marxist resources for
the cultural study of religion, especially as they attempt to describe the historical
development of secular, capitalist societies and the role of religions within them.
The Protestant Ethic Thesis
Of Weber’s thesis, there is no general agreement about its precise premises or
scope. It is clear, however, that in explaining the genesis of capitalism not only as a
system but as a culture or “spirit,” Weber took aim at Sombart as well as the
Marxists of his day. The view among them was a form of economic determinism that
discounted the role of individual agents in the processes of socio-historical devel-
opment. Against this, Weber proposed that “[o]ne of the fundamental elements of
the spirit of modern capitalism, and not only of that but of all modern culture:
rational conduct on the basis of the idea of the calling, was born – that is what this
discussion has sought to demonstrate – from the spirit of Christian asceticism”
(180). Weber’s emphasis falls on several factors in complex articulation, including
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subjectivity, motivation and rationality. The ascetic elements in the calling allowed
the scope of production to exceed traditional limits of need, and since it tended to
minimize consumption at the same time that it maximized production, promoted the
reinvestment of surplus production into the production process itself. In effect,
this asceticism provided the values that motivated the protestant entrepreneur who
developed capitalism as we have come to know it.
In addition to the organic metaphor of birth cited above, Weber also employs
figures that emphasize the transposition of elements and the transgression of re-
ceived limits. In reference to the specifically Protestant form of Christian asceticism,
the calling, Weber concludes: “The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are
forced to do so. For when asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into every-
day life, and began to dominate worldly morality, it did its part in building the
tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order” (181). While asceticism “did its
part,” we get little sense that other conditions were on hand to permit the building
to proceed. That is, in order to emphasize the role of this asceticism, Weber has to
take for granted other elements necessary to the development of capitalism. Since
these elements have a history as well, here we encounter a more or less arbitrary
historical demarcation regarding the real or true inaugural moment of capitalism.
Of course, to draw such a demarcation one must define the phenomenon at
issue, which Weber insists is “the rational capitalistic organization of (formally) free
labor” (21). Since Weber believes that the amoral and opportunistic “entrepreneur,
the capitalistic adventurer, has existed everywhere” (20), the catalytic factors at
first appear to be the elements of predictability and calculability entailed by the
rationalization of economic practices. Yet Weber later concedes that another ele-
ment is also a necessary precondition: “[e]xact calculation – the basis of everything
else – is only possible on a basis of free labour” (22). Thus, for the emergence of the
rational allocation and employment of resources, which Weber along with neoliberal
enthusiasts insist the market best achieves, laborers must be reduced from the
status of agents involved in production to resources or factors of production.
Though Marx treats this in depth, Weber does not analyze this fundamental shift,
and only treats the result, “(formally) free labor,” as a given, initial condition.
Here we touch on a choice of nomenclature no less arbitrary than the historical
demarcation – in fact, the two are fundamentally related. Weber puts “formally” into
parentheses, I believe, because intellectual honesty compels him to acknowledge
that this freedom was hardly a liberation in the eyes of the laborers. While it “freed”
labor for capitalist production, this liberation came at the cost of great suffering on
the part of the peasants whose customary way of life was lost forever. As we will
see, because Marx directly addresses this process in terms of primitive accumula-
tion, Weber’s ambivalence seems to acknowledge Marx’s contribution even as he
attempts to minimize it. Although these are theoretical issues of great complexity,
we can account briefly for this sleight of hand.
To accentuate the role of asceticism and the Protestant ethic in the genesis of
rational capitalistic enterprise, Weber must discount the more objective or material
factors that produced these conditions. This means that to avoid acknowledging
the emergence of free labor as a catalytic factor, and thus the brutal self-interest and
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power involved in this expropriation, Weber has to treat it as a given, indeed as
capitalism’s natural resource. Although, as Marx insists in Capital, “In actual history,
it is a notorious fact that conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, in short, force, play
the greatest part” (874), once labor is free, the focus can shift from force to motivation,
though this too will be cleansed of the threats of destitution, violence, and literal
starvation that serve as the perennial means of motivating free labor.
Once the situation has been trimmed in this way of all irrational elements, the
question of motivation looms large because, as Weber makes clear, “traditionalism”
(59) becomes the main obstacle, particularly in the sense that workers traditionally
resisted and continue to resist the rigors of rationalized, disciplined production,
which continues in Taylorism, Fordism and Toyotaism.7  Viewed through the inter-
pretive lens of the Protestant sense of a calling or vocation as divinely sanctioned
labor, Weber regards worker recalcitrance not as a rational preference for other values,
such as free time with friends and family, or independent leisure and study (which
Weber himself was fortunate enough to enjoy), but as an irrational resistance to
earning more wages. Hence, to those workers who lacked a sense of vocation, for
some literally unaccountable reason, “The opportunity of earning more was less at-
tractive than that of working less” (60). This leads to the perversity of a negatively
sloped labor supply curve, where “the worker reacted to the increase [of piece-rates]
not by increasing but by decreasing the amount of his work” (59).
It is a matter of significant irony, then, that Weber’s sharpest departure from
Marx is also the origin of some of the troubling aspects of the Weberian hegemony
in the study of religion. Beyond the facile equation of American geopolitical suc-
cess with Protestantism and its individualism and work ethic, the Weberian tends to
assume the essential rationality of capitalist social and economic formations, or at
least, as Peacock and Kirsch suggest, capitalism’s status as an unequivocal ad-
vance in the rationalization of social life over more primitive arrangements.8  Once
the rationality of the modern capitalist system has been assumed, one can retrospec-
tively claim that the primary obstacle to the development of capitalism was the back-
wardness, traditionalism, or basic irrationality of pre- and non-Protestant laborers
whose refusal to work more despite increased wages was due not to the lack of
consumer goods available on which to spend their wages, or the understandable
desire to enjoy leisure time, but a lack of motivation. By describing the laborer’s
resistance to the bridle of factory discipline as “stubborn” and “backward” (60), the
Weberian paradigm leads to the view that humans are traditionally and/or naturally
stricken with lassitude unless informed by appropriate values and coerced with ad-
equate incentives. Unfortunately, this shares much with the implicit picture of human
nature that allows such figures as Charles Murray, George Gilder, and Newt Gingrich to
vilify the poor for their poverty and defuse criticism of systemic economic inequalities
by explaining their plight as the inevitable consequence of a flawed character. By
taking a Marxist view according to which human labor is the most fundamental means
of self-realization and freedom,9  scholars of religion and culture can step outside this
post-lapsarian prejudice against labor, which in its present form is itself both a conse-
quence and a legitimation of capitalist relations of production.
Despite Weber’s ambivalence about the development of capitalism voiced at the
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end of the Protestant Ethic, such nuances rarely travel as far as the triumphalist
correlation of the Protestant articulation of asceticism as a calling, rationalization,
and capitalist success. Furthermore, as foreshadowed by Weber’s sense that work-
ing-class fragmentation in the form of free labor is required for the rational deployment
of resources, in his General Economic History “Weber treats [the model of the laissez-
faire capitalist economy] as an ideal type” (Collins 89). The economy as a machine
programmed to produce ideal equilibria retains an appeal in sharp contrast to Marx’s
arguments in the 1844 Manuscripts that, although there are indeed interdependent
relationships between the factors of production, the system’s tendency is not towards
equilibria but towards inevitable crises and suffering. These insights have not traveled
as far as neoliberal dogma, however, and the idea of the free market translates all too
easily onto the American religious terrain by way of the Disestablishment Clause of the
Constitution. This has allowed for the migration of rational choice theory from eco-
nomics and political science into religious studies as another front of an interdiscipli-
nary movement originated by Nobel-laureate Gary Becker.10
Just as Weber meant his Protestant Ethic to complement and correct the flatly
materialistic trend of quasi-Marxist economic determinism, scholars of religion now
need to correct a one-sided reception of Weber’s theses, restoring the means to
question the ersatz rationality projected onto social relations as well as the role
played by religion in class struggles. In true dialectical fashion, Weber’s demy-
thologizing narratives of rationalization and secularization have produced their
own myths, the most prevalent of which are the myths of the “end of ideology” and
the “iron cage of the status quo.” These myths degenerate into the type of dogmas
that mark the most ossified aspects of religious phenomena. Besides constituting a
capitulation to the Freudian death-drive constantly at work in discourses of every
kind, such narratives obscure the very real tensions – such as those between labor
and capital, sustainability and productivity, equality and accumulation – that beset
the capitalist mode of production. We will now turn to Marx’s account of religion’s
role in the development of capitalism, and show why it provides a more compelling
account of the process, even if it is less flattering to religion than Weber’s.
Marx and Religion as Palliative
The most infamous of Marx’s statements regarding religion occurs in his critique
of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, where Marx claims that “[r]eligion is the sigh of the
oppressed creature, the heart [or sentiment] of a heartless world, and the soul of
soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people” (12). According to this metaphor,
religion is a narcotic or palliative that treats the symptom but leaves the disease
(alienation and exploitative relations of production) intact. Marx continues, “The
abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of men, is a demand for their real
happiness. The call to abandon their illusions about their condition is a call to
abandon a condition which requires illusions” (12). Since unjust relations of
production require and produce illusions, religion here is a secondary effect of
exploitation. According to this passage, one might say that so long as the capitalist
mode of production persists, so will religion, both as exploitation’s symptom and,
more positively, its relatively harmless solace. At any rate, the abolition of religion
22     IJCS
will not cause social justice, but only demand it.
Yet this implicit temporal framework also seems to make the abolition a precondi-
tion of the revolution. Marx thus indicates the necessity of an interregnum between
religion’s abolition and the satisfaction of real happiness – namely, class justice.
This is a consequence of Marx’s conviction that he was living in such an interreg-
num, since Feuerbach had finished the critique of religion by tracing religious
claims about the divinity back to their origin as projections of human ideals and
desires. Hence, Marx’s entire sense of religion is predicated on the notion that,
despite the dubious status of its narratives and truth-claims, religion answers to
human needs, drives and desires that are themselves all too real. The secularization
was inevitable, and already begun.
Because Marx states in many places that the proletariat itself has to develop in
terms of number and cohesion before it will be ready to take control of the forces of
production and reorganize the relations of production according to egalitarian prin-
ciples, does it follow that one must begrudge the laboring masses whatever soporific
effects their religions can provide? The answer to this question depends upon how
one answers two others. First, given the dispersion of the proletariat along a con-
tinuum of suffering from near-absolute abjection to marginal deprivation and alien-
ation, how might the relevance of religion differ across this spectrum? Second, in
specific social and historical contexts, do we see religion serving only as a solace but
also as a diagnosis? In light of these questions, a Marxist treatment of religion would
involve an assessment more strategic than categorical, since in history religions have
encrypted class struggle in various codes, and a recovery of these traces of revolu-
tionary potential can transform the function of religions in today’s societies.
A comprehensive survey of the catalytic effects of religious practices and idioms is
not possible here, but one can suggest the range both in historical and geo-political
terms. We find the figure of Christ’s death playing a role in the explanation of the
importance of union radicalism in Gilded Age America,11  even as a history of Protes-
tant missionizing in Nicaragua contributed to the Miskito tribe’s rejection of the social
justice agenda of Catholic liberation theology, leading to the long civil war that deci-
mated the country, with US help.12  In the history of colonialism, biblical exegesis
informed lessons meant to refashion indigenous populations as wage-laborers,13  even
as African-Americans translated narratives such as the liberation of the Hebrews from
Egypt in ways that gave voice to their demands for emancipation.14
Religions in these examples are used for and against social justice movements,
both as an overt instrument as well as a veil to deny the reality of any opposition or
struggle. Despite the variety of ends served, this makes clear that religions are not
merely epiphenomena: religions are polyvalent, multi-use instruments in the class
struggle, ideological weapons of oppression as well as shared idioms in the struggle
for class justice. If we take Bourdieu’s treatment of art as an analogy, religion too is a
form of cultural capital. It can serve elite interests when dominant tastes and interpre-
tations privilege its formal aspects at the expense of message or content. That is, when
the formal aspects of religion (the subjection to authoritative higher beings, the con-
struction of a divinely sanctioned social order, the inculcation of dogmatic truth claims,
the employment of theodicy as a means to justify inequality and suffering, etc.) gain
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prevalence over ethico-political content, the reactionary propensities of religious phe-
nomena come to the fore. The heterogeneous contents,15  by contrast, cannot be
reduced to simple egalitarianism, to be sure, but nevertheless constitute a powerful
source of material and means for historical interpretation and contemporary action.
Especially for the most destitute, religion is often the only cultural capital readily
available to them, and thus becomes their primary heuristic device for confronting the
world-historical significance of exploitation and suffering, as well as excavating latent
possibilities of liberation and redemption.
 Religion and the Base/Superstructure Dichotomy
While religion played a prominent role in politico-economic struggles in diverse
contexts, Marx did not spend much effort engaging in specifically religious argu-
ments. Although generally taken to indicate the virulent atheism of Marxist theory,
his claim that religion is “the opium of the people” could also suggest that Marx’s
view of religion is in fact rather benign, a suggestion whose validity depends on the
contention that, for Marx, the real battleground for social justice lies elsewhere.
This diminished role for religion stems from Marx’s belief that, in order to under-
stand how society functions, we must see it not as a whole determined by an Idea
or an Epoch, as with the Hegelians, but as a heterogeneous system divided into
classes, and also into a base and a superstructure. As Raymond Williams suggests,
the base/superstructure dichotomy is the analogue of the Marxist “proposition
that social being determines consciousness” (3). In the base we find the forces and
relations of production, or the material aspects of the processes by which capitalist
accumulation reproduces itself. The superstructure, on the other hand, consists of
the spheres of law, morality, religion, etc., each producing ideological justifications
and rationalizations that attempt to suture or at least disguise the ineradicable
contradictions between the relations and forces of production in the base.
Because Marx attributes the greatest historical potency to practices and not
products of abstracted consciousness, the base/superstructure distinction also
seems analogous to the division between mental and manual labor. To posit religion
as purely superstructural and ideological, Marx utilizes a Protestant and Enlighten-
ment concept of religion, according to which its sole function is to provide believ-
ers with a coherent explanation of the world, explanations that are usually produced
by the clergy and consumed by the laity. This is a view shared by the scholars of
religion who embrace rational choice theory, leaving little room for the horizontal
development of religious capital as workers engage a capital-determined world with
religious-based heuristic and rhetorical tools.
Just as scholars of cultural studies have had to climb down from a rarefied,
Arnoldian notion of culture to reach the level of quotidian cultural practices, schol-
ars of religion are now criticizing this view of religion as a purely theoretical activity,
claiming that it is both over-intellectualized and elitist. Building on the dyad of
“encoding/decoding” developed in the work of Stuart Hall and the Birmingham
school of cultural studies, if one assumes that there is a necessary translation
between institutions, their discursive production, and lived experience, then the
lived religious experience of the laity is fashioned by the laity itself as it engages in
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a variety of activities, only some of which are ostensibly religious, though all are
informed by theory to some degree and all are, ultimately, practices. In this way, one
can begin to take into account the counter-practices with which the laity often
contests the meanings asserted by the clergy. Furthermore, with religious practitio-
ners engaged in community-building labor both mental (transmitting and contesting
dogma, narrating the collective memory of the community, etc.) and manual (construct-
ing cathedrals, monasteries, convents, orphanages, soup kitchens, food banks, etc.),
a depiction of religion as a purely superstructural phenomenon, an ideology produc-
ing false-consciousness, is much too limited. In fact, at great stake in the struggle is
often whether religious demands for justice are only to be realized in some other world
or in the here and now by radical social reconstruction – that is, whether religion is
rightly basic or merely superstructural. With religions as multiplex and heterogeneous
phenomena in which a cross-section of all classes participate, one cannot easily shunt
them to one side of the labor/capital or base/superstructure divide.
Why then does Marx himself keep religion contained within the superstructure?
In true dialectical fashion, this apparent abstraction combines with a kind of critical
privilege. Perhaps religion’s prominent role in Marx’s critical project derives from
his belief that “[r]eligion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopedic com-
pendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual point d’honneur, its enthusiasm, its
moral sanction, its solemn complement, its general basis of consolation and justifi-
cation” (“Critique of Hegel” 11). Indeed, Marx repeatedly uses religion as the first
term in analogies whose second term is the false appearance of one of the puta-
tively rational social relations under capitalism, as when he states that “primitive
accumulation plays approximately the same role in political economy as original sin
does in theology” (Capital 873).
A further explanation is that Marx is above all a realist, and in his lifetime the
intellectual, superstructural modes of religion tended to prevail. In other words,
Marx’s social being determined his consciousness. Marx was a child of the Enlight-
enment, and as such he took much from a Protestant iconoclastic rhetoric and
turned it, not against other religions, as the Protestants did, but against society in
its contemporary form. Religion, then, to Marx, was the paradigmatic but also weak-
est element of the superstructure, the one most readily criticized in order to reveal,
pars pro toto, the ideological nature of the superstructure – and hence capitalist
society – as a whole. In this light, in order for religion to function as a metonym for
the ideological nature of the capitalist system, it is important for religion to remain
firmly within the superstructure.
However, here we need a more dialectical view, one which is provided by looking at
religious phenomena in Maussian terms as “total social facts.” This in fact closely
resembles Marxist analysis, in that one recognizes not only that “each of the special
systems is only a part of the whole social system,” but also “the supreme fact that they
form a system” (qtd. in Goffman 66). In this light, religions, in making total claims about
the world and providing the means for people to engage and contest that world,
subvert the synechdochic/metonymic relation of part to whole.16  As in the paradox of
the set of all sets, religions are parts of society that simultaneously claim to address or
even comprise the whole, not only of society, but of nature as well.
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The view that religions and other elements of the superstructure are determined
effects of a determining base seems to be a serious flaw in the Marxist framework.
Yet Williams suggests ways to salvage this schema. By shifting from a view of
determination that entails a fixed and mechanical expression to one where determi-
nation involves defining constraints and exerting pressures that delimit a finite set
of possibilities, we can both account for the sense of freedom that superstructural
phenomena often provide at the same time that we understand why superstructural
liberation recalls Gramscian hegemony, in that it is predicated on leaving the base –
understood in the largest sense as the reproduction of capitalist society as a class
society – uncontested.17  In just this way, “On the Jewish Question,” for example, is
not an essay whose primary target is religion per se, but rather state religion’s
articulation as civil religion. In this essay Marx rejects the ostensible liberation of
the state from religion, and the palliative of religious freedom, as a mere semblance
of real liberation, which, if it is to have any reality at all, will not only be religious and
political but also economic. Religious liberation within the state is comparatively
easy, since it involves an abstraction from social inequality and has in fact already
taken place “ideally” – for, of course, we are all equal in the eyes of the gods. In
regards to Jewish liberation, then, Marx saw that overcoming oppression did not
consist simply in the surpassing of state religion for this too easily feeds into a
religion of the state. Civil religion worships the state as an entity to which all loyalty
is due because it supposedly guarantees, among other things, religious freedom,
yet this same entity plays a critical role in constructing firewalls that keep the
hunger for liberation from taking the inequities of civil society as its object.
Marx on Religion in History
Having salvaged a Marxist view of religious phenomena, we can examine more
closely Marx’s treatment of religions in specific historical contexts. We must con-
sider how Marx uses religion in his texts, in ways already discussed (as the clearest
example of a super-structural phenomenon, or as the paradigmatic form of ideol-
ogy), but also as an inflecting filter of socio-historical forces. In doing so, we will
see that Marx himself recognizes religion’s context-dependent role in the produc-
tion and reproduction of social relations. In doing this I want to suggest that Marx’s
ambivalence about religion bifurcates along the lines of two divergent textual strat-
egies: that of historiography and systematic theory.
As noted above, Marx often employs religious idioms when constructing analogies
illustrating the false interpretations of prevailing politico-economic conditions. Be-
cause these analogies criticize contemporary phenomena, they generally remain within
the synchronic perspective of capitalism as a regnant mode of production. In these
synchronic terms, Marx describes religion as totally determined by the dominant mode
of production, and thus wholly incapable of mounting an offensive against its hege-
mony. By contrast, when the pre-history or genesis of capitalism itself is in question,
Marx’s analysis is more complex, and often strikes a different chord.
The first example I cite is Marx’s account in the first volume of Capital of the
period of “primitive accumulation” in sixteenth-century England. One of the conse-
quences of the Reformation movements on the European mainland was Henry
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VIII’s secularization of England’s monasteries and other church properties. As
Marx described it, “[t]he process of forcible expropriation of the people received a
new and terrible impulse in the sixteenth century of the Reformation, and the conse-
quent colossal spoliation of church property” (881). Marx thus links secularization
causally to primitive accumulation. Secularization and its correlatives, the processes
of commons enclosure and estate engrossment, involved not only the reallocation
of land and rights, for “[t]he property of the church formed the religious bulwark of
the old conditions of landed property. With its fall, these conditions could no
longer maintain their existence” (881). Serving as an impetus and example, secular-
ization had a profound effect on both the peasants and the landed gentry, but was
merely a part of a greater transformation – not only a land grab but also an expro-
priation that moved a great way towards producing Weber’s formally free workers,
a class of people with no other resource to sell than their living labor.
Because the enclosure of common lands and the engrossment of large estates
entailed the expulsion of great masses of peasants, this primitive capital accumula-
tion instantiated the naked facts of class struggle, since the ruling class’s accumu-
lation involved not a simple appropriation of a natural resource, but the expropria-
tion of the peasantry, producing a veritable army of the unemployed ready for
proletarianization. Marx suggests there is a strong religious and political connec-
tion between the monastery expropriations and the land enclosures: in effect, the
religious upheaval produced socio-economic effects by forming a correlation, im-
parting an impetus, and providing a rationale. Even if one insists that the monastery
expropriations were economic (basic) events facilitated by a religious (superstruc-
tural) justification, this religious aspect added greatly to the velocity of the pro-
cess, thus producing specific effects due to the flood of destitute peasants too
suddenly uprooted for the contemporary level of productive forces to absorb. In
the same way, the fact that the uprooted peasants had only customary and not
legally binding claims to the land illustrates the way that superstructural phenom-
ena (the common law, legal reasoning, juridical institutions) produce effects in the
base, thus putting the validity of a starkly contrastive reading of this dichotomy
into question. Even if one argues that religious phenomena like the Reformation are
only effects of socio-economic forces, as Marx seems to do,18  it is difficult to
maintain that religion as an element of the superstructure is nothing but a reflection
pure and simple, and cannot in turn affect the socio-economic base. Religion does
not reinvent the world in its image, but it quickens and retards various processes in
that world in context-dependent ways.
The final historical instance I will discuss examines religion not in terms of the
genesis of capitalism, but as a factor in the genesis of society as a whole. At one
point in The German Ideology Marx and Engels, while discussing the origins of
society, suggest that it is correlated with the origin of the social division of labor,
which must be distinguished from the division of labor that arises from merely
natural sexual and physiological differences. By contrast with these:
Division of labour only becomes truly such from the moment
when a division of material and mental labour appears. (The first
form of ideologists, priests, is concurrent.) From this moment
onwards consciousness can really flatter itself that it is some-
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thing other than consciousness of existing practice, that it really
represents something without representing something real; from
now on consciousness is in a position to emancipate itself from
the world and to proceed to the formation of ‘pure’ theory, theol-
ogy, philosophy, ethics, etc (51-2).
Marx and Engels present the priesthood as present at the origin of the social
division of labor. With the distinction between manual and mental labor, properly
religious roles, as perhaps the most definitive and socially recognizable effects of
this division, play a pivotal part in generating a permanent qualitative division of
labor that will have momentous consequences. By making religion as a separate
institution coeval with the social division of labor, it is virtually impossible to hold that
religion is solely superstructural and thus only an effect of social forces, because at
minimum religion is responsible for reproducing obfuscating distinctions such as that
between mental and manual labor. Religion in its present form, then, as the dialectical
origin and effect of the division between mental and manual labor, helps account for
the origin of our upside-down world, a semblance whose corrective – but often over-
stated – reversal is the dichotomy of base and superstructure.
In conclusion, this prominence of the base/superstructure dichotomy in Marx’s
work stems from two different approaches that he employed at different times.
When Marx is interested in showing how the capitalist system hangs together as a
disjointed, fractured, but incredibly dynamic whole, that is, from a synchronic per-
spective, the base/superstructure distinction helps to clarify the real determining
priority of some social functions. Likewise, the synchronic perspective, which by
definition excludes historical change in order to reveal a variety of regulated “trans-
formations,” necessarily presents religion as a superstructural reflection incapable
of effecting change. By contrast, when Marx shifts to historical examinations, the
diachronic role of religion in shaping society is impossible to deny.
Marx and the “Criticism of Religion”
If I have argued that Marx exhibited a great deal of complexity in his treatment of
religion, I have thus far done nothing to shake the impression that he was opposed
to it in general. The ambiguities we have examined so far only regard its degree of
culpability – that is, whether it is a secondary, superstructural ideology or an insidi-
ous factor of exploitation in its own right. There remains, however, another degree
of ambivalence for us to excavate.
Just before the “opium” passage quoted earlier, Marx states that “die Kritik der
Religion ist die Voraussetzung aller Kritik” (“the criticism of religion is the premise of
all criticism”) (“Critique of Hegel” 11). There are three terms here that require elucida-
tion: criticism, religion, and premise. To begin with the latter: in logic and rhetoric, a
premise is the first term of a syllogism or the first proposition of an argument, which is
usually meant to be a self-evident or obvious assertion to which one’s interlocutor will
readily assent. How curious for Marx to present a kind of criticism as a premise. If
criticism requires a questioning and skeptical stance taken towards an erstwhile given,
an attitude opposed to the self-evident status of all premises, criticism as premise
becomes an anti-premise. Is Marx’s critical project to reject on principle the rhetorical
reliance on premises, this most traditional means of persuasion and consent?
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I believe not, for Marx was above all a historical thinker, and criticism is a term
that has had an identifiable history. As Marx encountered it, criticism as a mode of
discourse was an Enlightenment project, and the skeptical aspect of criticism was
merely one stage on the way towards a greater goal. Kant’s self-described critical
philosophy attempted to establish the limits of knowledge in order to unmask the
dogmas of reason that led Hume to contest them by rejecting notions such as
subject and causality. Kant’s theory that human knowledge of the world is con-
structed according to a priori conditions made the critical evaluation of premises
and presuppositions more than a necessary step in the process of knowledge
construction. Because knowledge of the world is an expression of human activity,
criticism removes impediments to the exercise of this most essential form of human
agency, making criticism tantamount to emancipation. Thus, many saw Kant’s epis-
temological theory as directly relevant to political economy as well. In the next
generation, the young Hegel was inspired by the French Revolution, though the
elderly Hegel asserted that the only thing necessary for liberation is for us all to
realize that the rationality of freedom was precisely what had been instituted by the
modern nation state: in effect, freedom was to be won by coming to understand
how free we already were, or at least, were already on the way to becoming.19  Even
the Left Hegelians, rejecting this position, merely proposed alternative types of
conversion or insight as means of achieving freedom. Thus, critical philosophy as
Marx inherited it was an unfinished project threatened with ossification by decades
of theoretical blinkers. Marx was the first critical philosopher to reject mental labor’s
privileged status and announce, in the eleventh “Theses on Feuerbach,” “The
philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to
change it” (109). With this, “criticism”, derived from the Greek krinein [“to judge, to
separate, to distinguish”], had traveled full circle: where once a critic abstained
from practice in order to attain a more objective perspective, now a critic actively
engaged in history as a socio-political agent, thus contributing to a communal
project of emancipation.
As for the third term, I have already stated that Marx has an intellectual view of
religion and explicitly employs iconoclastic rhetoric in many places, particularly in his
analysis of commodity fetishism, by making false ideas analogous to idols wrshipped
by the credulous. Furthermore, as an analyst of capitalism, Marx was decidedly
Eurocentric; thus, when Marx speaks of religion, he does not use the plural, and I do
not think that he had much else in mind than the European Christianity, Catholic or
Protestant, which again and again seemed to side with elites in class struggles.20
A common feature of Enlightenment critics (and many Reformation theorists) is
a disquiet regarding the frequent collusion between church and state. Of course,
this was not always the case. As perhaps the first form of international coalition, the
various world religions often developed as adversarial movements within the do-
main of existing state religions. This circumstance often provided their practitio-
ners with a critical distance from the sovereign powers of the state as well as
dominant social practices. Along these lines, Marx quotes Luther’s rebuke of usu-
rers for preying upon the poor with approval.21  Marx, then, could admire the reli-
gious when they challenged existing forms of exploitation, and the fact that it was
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often precisely a religious perspective that informed this challenge could not have
been lost on him. In speaking of ideological institutions, then, it seems that Marx
condemns in particular the religions that failed to maintain this distance from the
state and capitulated entirely to power.
Finally, I want to examine a syntactic element of the sentence above, the posses-
sive preposition “of” in the phrase “criticism of religion.” One of the most effective
critical methods that Marx learned from his predecessors was the strategic reversal,
the substitution of effects for causes, actions for agents, and qualities for objects.
A dialectical view of the phrase, then, would give us, “religion’s criticism is the
premise of all criticism.” Though grammatically permissible, what, if anything, does
this linguistic ambiguity reveal about Marx’s relationship to religion?
There is a great deal of variation in Marx’s positions, but an early letter to Ruge
is widely considered to be his first programmatic statement of purpose, and in many
ways it supports the genetive reversal that depicts Marx’s project as consistent
with religion’s criticism, that is, with religions when they challenge exploitation:
Our motto must therefore be: Reform of consciousness not
through dogmas, but through analyzing the mystical conscious-
ness, the consciousness which is unclear to itself, whether it
appears in religious or political form. Then it will transpire that
the world has long been dreaming of something that it can ac-
quire if only it becomes conscious of it. It will transpire that it is
not a matter of drawing a great dividing line between past and
future, but of carrying out the thoughts of the past. And finally, it
will transpire that mankind begins no new work, but consciously
accomplishes its old work…. It is a matter of confession, no more.
To have its sins forgiven mankind has only to declare them to be
what they really are (10).
While still cast in the quasi-religious language of theory (“reform of conscious-
ness,” “consciously,” “confession,” “declaration”) and thus before Marx’s turn to
practice, from this passage one senses that he builds upon the prophetic, critical
components of religion even as he criticizes religion’s dogmatic ossifications. What
Marx meant when he criticized religion, then, was European Christianity, aligned
with the state and renouncing all critical distance, heliotropically turning towards
wealth and power. What Marx explicitly criticized was less religion in the widest
possible sense than specific religions performing certain functions. In this broader
sense of religion, as not only the mournful sigh but also the rallying cry of op-
pressed masses, Marx’s project is a continuation of its “old work,” the quest for the
amelioration of suffering and, ultimately, that “longest dream,” equity for all.
The critique of Weber and the return to Marx that this essay has pursued should
suggest that we are never more beset by a fixed, inflexible and unconscious narra-
tive than when we insist that we are finished with or beyond religion. Every disen-
chantment dialectically conjures its own enchantment. As certain scholarly con-
ceits regarding secularization and rationalization have come to seem so obvious
that they are no longer questioned, scholars would do better to treat religions like
the Greeks treated their myths, with a supple and inquisitive joy in re-presenting
them and subjecting them to interrogation. Like myths, religions provoke thought,
and accomplish more cultural work than just training people to parrot received
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ideas. Indeed, religions should not be merely objects of critique, for in history each
has also been the source and stimulus of multiple modes of critical reflection.
Although Marx is often misunderstood as the very voice of dogmatic atheism, his
heterogeneous corpus borrows a great deal from religion. Therefore, it can only be
to the benefit of scholars who would examine the role of religions in socio-cultural
reproduction to excavate the thread of religious critique in the works of this critic of
religion, as one step in helping us understand how his texts converted so many
with their depictions of society, and how they continue to illuminate the function of
religion and culture in the world today.
Notes
I would like to express my gratitude to this essay’s two anonymous reviewers.
Their critiques and suggestions were immensely helpful, and this essay was much
improved as a result of their scholarly generosity.
1 The problem scholars of religion have had with the determination of religion by
politico-economic phenomena is a sense that any explicit relation had to be me-
chanical, one-way, and thus formulaic. Of course, such a view of determination was
decisively complicated by Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, with generations of schol-
ars such as Raymond Williams, Stuart Hall, Fredric Jameson and Lawrence Grossberg
exploring the complicated relationships between cultural spheres and the various
modes of late capitalism. Since a fear of determinism now serves only to isolate the
field of religious studies from related fields such as anthropology and cultural
studies, the goals of this essay are, first, that scholars of religion will move beyond
the cliches of determinism that make Marx taboo, and, second, that scholars of
culture will begin to take religions seriously as primary modes of acculturation and
storehouses of polyvalent cultural capital.
2 Reductionism is the term that arose in religious studies to describe the position
that religions have no content or phenomena that one cannot better describe in
terms of socio-cultural or politico-economic phenomena. In some variants, reduc-
tionism designates the mechanical determination of religious by extra-religious
phenomena commonly seen in “vulgar marxist” and ideological critiques.
3 In The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion, Berger
brings Durkheim and Weber together in the central metaphor of the title: while
religions as social projections once provided communities with an overarching
framework and means of cohesion (Durkheim’s social function of religion), Berger
hypothesizes that, as societies modernize, this integrative function will shift from
religion to science and other disenchanted institutions and discourses (Weber’s
rationalization and secularization as historical trends).
4 The data is still coming in, but one illuminating report, “The Scorecard on
Globalization 1980-2000: Twenty Years of Diminished Progress,” can be found on
the Center for Economy and Policy Research website at www.cepr.net.
5 In his influential essay, “Civil Religion in America,” and numerous other pub-
lications, Bellah adopted the Durkheimian position and argued convincingly that
the putatively secular nation-state gradually became re-enchanted by means of
discourses and rituals of civic pride, loyalty and patriotism.
Roberts     31
6 For a self-consciously liberal work that still takes this narrative for granted, see Eck.
7 On the persistence of working-class resistance in the form of customary holidays
like Saint Monday, as well as the admonitions with which the clergy attempted to instill
in workers a sense of time amenable to capitalist production, see Thompson.
8 While an unquestionable advance in terms of productivity, the advance is
equivocal in regards to other metrics, such as social justice, egalitarianism, ecologi-
cal responsibility, and long-term sustainability.
9 In the eighth “Theses on Feuerbach“ we read: “Social life is essentially prac-
tical. All mysteries which mislead theory into mysticism find their rational solution
in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice” (109).
10 For a key development in this project, see Becker. Becker’s acolytes in religious
studies include such scholars as Rodney Stark, Roger Finke and Laurence Iannacone.
11 From the Coast Seaman’s Journal we read: “Christ taught that all men had
souls and were therefore equal in the finality of things. For that He was put to death.
But it was not for preaching the doctrine of a common equality before God that the
Saviour suffered. The Powers have never objected to changing the conditions and
relations of the future: it is the conditions and relations of today they object to
altering. Christ was crucified because the doctrine of common equality hereafter,
which He preached, led inevitably to the doctrine of common equality now. This is
the essence of Christ’s teaching” (quoted in Gutman 96).
12 “[A]s the Bible became part of the communication of Miskitu ethnic identity,
it was not just a means of differentiating themselves from the Spanish. It was also
an affirmation of allegiance towards the powerful Anglo domain, in which the Miskitu
had embedded themselves when they converted to Christianity. It was this alle-
giance which led the Miskitus to side with the US in their covert war to topple the
Sandinista government” (Hawley 338).
13 The examples here are legion. The ethnographic work of Michael Taussig
provides multiple South American examples. In terms of the history of Central and
South America, “The Bible was read and interpreted according to colonial and
occidental interests…. The biblical schema of the conquest by Joshua of the
Canaanite people was applied to the conquest of the indigenous peoples. Indig-
enous religions were fought by using the prophetic tradition of opposition to
idolatry.… Juan Gines de Sepulveda was ... easily able to utilize the Bible and
occidental Christian thought in order to justify the most horrible genocide in the
history of Christendom” (Richard 306).
14 “Christian slaves thus applied the Exodus story, whose end they knew, to
their own experience of slavery…. Exodus functioned as an archetypal myth for the
slaves…. By appropriating the story of Exodus as their own story, black Christians
articulated their own sense of peoplehood. Exodus symbolized their common his-
tory and common destiny…. Exodus became dramatically real, especially in the
songs and prayer meetings of the slaves, who reenacted the story as they shuffled
in the ring dance they called ‘the shout’” (Raboteau 84).
15 This heterogeneous content involves such disparate but interrelated phe-
nomena as scripture and ritual, clerical codifications of worship and lay improvisa-
tion, cosmological models and ethical principles. Even within scripture, the legiti-
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macy of which often depends upon the semblance of homogeneity, one finds mul-
tiple strata of interpretation and redaction, as well as heterogeneous discursive
modes, such as myths, priestly taxonomies, genealogies, and historical fragments.
16 Williams suggests that the base is open to the same expansion: “Now when
we talk of the base, and of primary productive forces, it matters very much whether
we are referring, as in one degenerate form of this proposition became habitual, to
primary production within the terms of capitalist economic relationships, or to the
primary production of society itself, and of men themselves, material production
and reproduction of real life. If we have the broad sense of productive forces, we look
at the whole question of the base differently, and we are then less tempted to dismiss
as superstructural, and in that sense as merely secondary, certain vital productive
social forces, which are in the broad sense, from the beginning, basic” (6).
17 “We have to revalue ‘determination’ towards the setting of limits and the
exertion of pressure, and away from a predicted, prefigured, and controlled content.
We have to revalue ‘superstructure’ towards a related range of cultural practices,
and away from a reflected, reproduced or specifically dependent content. And,
crucially, we have to revalue ‘the base’ away from the notion of a fixed economic or
technological abstraction, and towards the specific activities of men in real social
and economic relationships, containing fundamental contradictions and variations
and therefore always in a state of dynamic process” (Williams 6).
18 In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels note how, if “theory, theology,
philosophy, ethics comes into contradiction with the existing relations, this can
only occur because existing social relations have come into contradiction with
existing forces of production” (52). That is, a superstructural contradiction devel-
ops only when there is the necessary condition of a contradiction in the base.
19 I do not want to make Hegel an ex post facto revolutionary, but the statement
from his “Preface” to Elements of the Philosophy of Right – one translation of which
reads “What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational” (20) – suggests a
debunking reading closely akin to Marx: to discover the rational, look not to the ideal
but only to the real, although Marx certainly disputes Hegel’s account of what the real
in fact is. Thus, Hegel can be read as more anti-Kantian than pro-Prussian.
20 Of the three major apostolic movements of the 12th and 13th centuries which
championed poverty as a spiritual ideal (this is not meant to imply that these were
precursors of Marxism, for the latter does not “advocate” poverty), one became co-
opted (the Franciscans) while two, the Waldensians and the Cathars, wound up on
the wrong side of the Albigensian Crusade.
21 “[W]e hang the small thieves... Little thieves are put in the stocks, great
thieves go flaunting in gold and silk... Therefore is there, on this earth, no greater
enemy of man (after the devil) than a gripe-money, and usurer, for he wants to be
God over all men” (Luther quoted in Capital 740). Remarkably, the sanctification of
interest was a Franciscan project, meant, in part, to encourage charitable giving and
increase monetary liquidity. From a stark dichotomy between charity and usury,
Francis of Assisi helped develop the modern gradations between low-interest (fair
or charitable) loans and exorbitant (predatory and illegal) usury.
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